The Vedic Light of Advaita: Thirty-Two

The Ultimate Conclusion of Self-Luminosity and the Role of Ignorance:

The question is—between the Self (ātmā) and the not-Self (anātmā), which one's self-luminosity do you accept? Since the argument for self-luminosity is equally powerful in both cases—meaning that just as the Self's essence, when analyzed apart from all its attributes, appears as self-luminous and without qualities, so too does the not-Self—it is clear that both are identical in the Self. By "equally powerful" we mean that in both cases their essence cannot be determined through external proofs; rather, they announce their own existence by themselves.

Therefore, we have proven that the Self—which is by nature self-luminous, pure bliss, relationless, and without desire—manifests in manifold forms through association with ignorance (avidyā), an eternal and unknowable (indescribable) covering. This passage is a summary of the fundamental principle of Advaita philosophy. The Self is the supreme truth, which is naturally illuminated (self-luminous), the source of bliss (pure bliss), unrelated to anything (relationless), and not driven by any kind of desire (without desire). This alone is the formless, attribute-less, and supreme being.

But if the Self alone is the truth, then what is the source of this diverse world where we see Self and not-Self, manifold objects and persons? Advaitins explain this through "avidyā" or ignorance. Avidyā is such a power or covering that is eternal and unknowable (indescribable), which veils the supreme truth of the Self and makes it appear in many forms.

Just as a rope in darkness sometimes appears as a snake, sometimes as a stick or something else, yet in reality it is only a rope—similarly, in truth there is no duality, neither duality nor non-duality—only the Self, pure consciousness exists. This analogy beautifully explains the relationship between avidyā and the world to Brahman. Just as a rope appears falsely as a snake or stick in darkness, so due to the māyā born of ignorance, the one and non-dual Self appears to manifest in many forms, as world and individual souls. But ultimately, only the pure consciousness-Self is true.

The significance of saying "neither duality nor non-duality" is that though duality appears, it is not real; and though non-duality alone is the truth, under the influence of ignorance this non-dual reality appears in different forms. Therefore, it is impossible to express the ultimate truth completely in language. In the end, only the realization that "the Self, pure consciousness alone exists" is the ultimate goal of non-dual understanding.

The Opponent's Objection: Can the Self Not Be Humanity's Goal?

Here the opponent raises an important objection: the Self cannot serve as humanity's goal. Their argument is that a person who, through accumulated merit and exhaustion of sins in the endless cycle of existence, sees the faults in all earthly objects and feels sorrow, turns away from perishable present and future enjoyments, and desires liberation as the supreme human aim—for such a person, the Self cannot serve as a goal. This objection is built upon a particular mental state and conception of spiritual journey.

The opponent accepts the eternality of the Self. In their view, there is no way to destroy the Self because the Self is not a 'product' (kārya) or created substance. That is, what is not created cannot be destroyed either. The destruction of the Self cannot even be imagined, because when the Self exists, the question of its non-existence does not arise; and if the Self's non-existence occurs, there would be no 'knower' (grāhaka), meaning no Self, to know it. This argument emphasizes the self-establishment of the Self's existence.

Moreover, the opponent also rejects attempts to infer the impermanent nature of the Self from its infinity. Because the Self's very nature is 'selfhood' (ātmatva), and the Self is infinite. The sages have declared: "Since in this world the Self is all-pervasive, sustains and enjoys everything, and since its presence is never interrupted, it is called the Self (ātmā)." This statement establishes the Self's all-pervasive and all-supporting nature.

The Misinterpretation of 'Pervasiveness' and the Advaitin's Refutation:

The opponent raises another argument that things like space, time, and place are also pervasive or infinite like the Self, yet these are impermanent. In response, the Advaitin says this argument results from a misunderstanding of the word 'pervasiveness' (parivyāpti). 'Pervasiveness' does not merely mean being infinite; its true meaning is—relationship with everything, complete relationship, that is, being the substrate of everything.

To clarify this concept further, it is said that a finite (non-pervasive) object can never completely pervade another finite object. If this were possible, then the object being pervaded could not maintain any independent existence of its own, because it would be entirely covered by the pervader. If it had independent character, then complete pervasion would not occur. This argument attempts to establish the Self's infinite and independent existence.

The Self's Self-Luminosity—No Need for Proof: Though the Self is limitless in terms of time, space, and substance, no other proof is needed to know it, because the Self is self-luminous like the sun. The scripture (śruti) has declared: "When the Self shines, then everything shines after it; by its light all this is illuminated." This statement is a central concept of Advaita Vedanta—the Self is self-revealing, independent of any other knowledge.

The Opponent's Persistent Objection: Is the Absence of Pleasure and Pain Humanity's Goal?

Still, the opponent remains firm in their previous position. They say the Self cannot be accepted as humanity's goal because it is something other than the absence of pleasure and pain. In their view, the absence of pleasure and pain alone is humanity's only goal. This claim is a form of hedonism or pain-elimination philosophy prevalent in many Indian philosophical traditions.

'Unfitness for Adoption as Goal'—Analysis and Refutation of Various Definitions:

The Advaitin then asks the opponent to clarify what exactly they mean by this "unfitness for adoption as goal" and presents six possible definitions:

(a) Not something that can be grasped by hand (literally not graspable): This definition does not help the opponent, because it leads the Advaitin to readily accept the conclusion that the Self cannot be grasped by hand. But this brings another conclusion that the opponent is unwilling to accept: pleasure and the absence of pain are also not humanity's goal, because these too cannot be grasped by hand.

(b) Cannot be an object of desire: This definition is also ineffective, because it would prove that both "desiring" and "being an object of desire"—both conditions could apply to the Self. Here an argument is essentially raised against the Naiyāyikas, who believe that not the Self, but the absence of pleasure and pain is humanity's supreme aim. The Advaitin asks for clear explanation of this claim and refutes the Naiyāyika argument that calls the Self unfit as a goal.

If fitness to be humanity's life-goal depends solely on "being an object of desire," then an irrational conclusion would follow—pain too would have to be humanity's goal. Because only what can be known can be an object of desire; and pain too can be known. Therefore, logically pain too should be humanity's goal—which no one would accept.

The Advaitin then examines the Naiyāyika position more deeply. They assume that unfitness to be humanity's life-goal depends on this reason: when an object is not the object of human desire, the opposite means—what is an object of desire is fit for adoption as goal.

According to Naiyāyikas, in the sentence "I desire happiness," three elements are revealed: (i) the desired object or viṣaya; (ii) desire or icchā; and (iii) being the object of desire or icchā-viṣayatā. The last two actually exist as qualities of the viṣaya—meaning "happiness" here exists not merely in its own being, but in relation to desire. The Advaitin asks whether Naiyāyikas consider these "qualities" (viśeṣaṇas) as inherent in the object and part of the object's essence, or not.

This definition is also ineffective because:

The knowledge from which desire arises for the absence of pain also reveals pain (as its opposite).

Only a part of the object cannot be taken as the goal. Because in the case of bliss there is no partial desire—bliss is desirable in its entirety.

Only the "subjective portion" of the object cannot be taken as the goal. For example, if someone says—"I attain heaven"—then the Self too would have to be accepted as a goal (which the opponent is unwilling to accept).

(c) Not achievable through will-power (sādhya): The third definition is also useless; because even though pain and pain-causing instruments are achievable through will-power, no one calls these humanity's goal.

(d) Something that is different from both the absence of pleasure and pain, with the qualification described by (c) above: The fourth definition is also wrong; because the qualification added to it is unnecessary. Since no one accepts means but only results (i.e., only bliss) as the highest human aim.

(e) Simply different from the absence of pleasure and pain, without any additional qualification: The fifth definition is also invalid; because here the thing to be proven (sādhya) and the proof (hetu) are identical—therefore, the logic collapses.

(f) Unfit as goal for some completely other reason: This definition is unclear and has no specific foundation.

Thus, each of the definitions with which the opponent tried to prove the Self unfit as a human goal contains flaws. Not accepting the Self as identical with pain does not negate its all-pervasive nature.

The opponent is also unable to establish any new definition, because the view that "the Self is identical with pain and pain-causing instruments" has already been refuted, since no one accepts such a view.

If the opponent says that in this way (i.e., by not accepting the Self as identical with pain) the Self's all-pervasive nature is destroyed, then the answer is: by all-pervasive we mean that the Self is the substrate of everything. Accepting the identity of the real (satya) with the unreal (mithyā) does not destroy the real.

And since the opponent cannot provide any explanation for calling the Self unfit as a human goal, the Advaitin asks: what exactly did they prove against us? (That is, aiṣṭa, argument without proof or merely wish-dependent reasoning).

Is the Absence of Pleasure and Pain the Only Freedom?

Finally the opponent responds that what is acceptable as humanity's highest goal must necessarily be independent compared to everything else. And only the absence of pleasure and pain has this independence; because everything else is classified (as goal) under these. But the Self is different from the absence of pleasure and pain. Because since the Self is a positive entity (bhāvarūpatvena), it cannot be the elimination or negation of pain.