The Vedas in the Light of Advaita: Twenty-Eight

In Vedic statements concerning creation, no actual differentiation (bheda between Brahman as cause and the world as effect) is revealed. This is because these statements contain no words that carry the meaning of "differentiation." Any sentence can express only that meaning which its words bear—whether through their mutual grammatical relationships or by signifying the identity of subject, object, and predicate. If the statement "the world originates from Brahman" carried the meaning of differentiation, there would be some linguistic or grammatical indication of this. Since no such indication exists, differentiation cannot be proven by this statement.

Subject-Object-Predicate in Advaita Vedanta

1. The fundamental position of Advaita Vedanta: At the ultimate level of truth (paramārthika), the Self/Brahman is the sole reality. This Self is unchanging, inactive, non-dual, merely a witness (sākṣī). Therefore, there is no real doer, action, or predication—all these appear only due to ignorance/maya.

2. The practical level (vyāvahārika satya): Under the veil of maya, we perceive three divisions in the world—

Subject (kartā / doer): That which thinks of itself, "I am acting." Advaita explains: the subject is actually the individual soul conditioned by limiting adjuncts (a mixed perception of the Self with body-mind-ego).

Object (karma / deed): That upon which action occurs. All objective nature in the world is actually maya-manifested; in Brahman's ultimate essence there is no action.

Predicate (vidheya / action or attribute): The relationship or action that connects subject and object. Example: "I am reading a book." Here, reading is the predicate. Advaita says: the Self never "reads"; reading is an activity of the inner instrument (antaḥkaraṇa) connected with ego.

3. Advaita's analysis: The Self is never a doer, it is only a witness (draṣṭā). The role of doer comes from ego born of ignorance. Object and predicate arise from the activities of limiting adjuncts (body-mind-senses). When liberating knowledge dawns, one realizes: subject = false notion created by ignorance, object = world created by maya, predicate = false causal relationship.

In dreams you consider yourself a doer and act—within the dream, all three—doer, deed, and predication—seem true. But upon awakening, you realize there was no real doer or deed, only the appearance of consciousness. Similarly, in Advaita, worldly subject-object-predicate are actually false appearances created by ignorance; the Self is merely witness. The world is like a dream. In Advaita Vedanta—the Self is not a doer, only a witness. Subject, object, predicate → all are true at the level of ignorance-maya, false in Brahman-knowledge.

Therefore, from creation-statements alone one cannot simply infer that the world is different from Brahman. For such inference would contradict negation-statements (like "neti neti"—"not this, not that"). In Vedanta philosophy, śruti (the Vedas) stands supreme as direct evidence, and human inference is always secondary to śruti's direct declarations. When śruti directly proclaims non-difference, the apparent notion of difference arising from creation-statements cannot override śruti's fundamental teaching. These statements are not evidence for dualism, but rather a means of establishing Brahman as the sole cause of the world and refuting other erroneous philosophical doctrines. These statements ultimately support non-dual knowledge, where Brahman alone is the supreme truth and the world is merely its apparent manifestation. The entire teaching of the Vedas revolves around the knowledge of non-difference, and proper interpretation of creation-statements is essential to maintain this core teaching.

And if it is argued—"Knowledge requires an object, and knowledge is impossible without some different support; therefore the known object must necessarily be different from knowledge"—the response is that this is merely a notion of differentiation. In reality, everything abides in Brahman-natured consciousness. The claim of object-knowledge-differentiation is therefore not permanent or ultimate truth. When the Vedas speak of "creation," their purpose is not to show the world as separate from Brahman; rather, by refuting other false theories of causation, they demonstrate—Brahman alone is the cause, the sole truth, there is no second.

A sentence (vākya) expresses meaning in two ways—predicatively: expressing some relationship (saṃsarga) between the meanings of words. Through non-difference: expressing only the identity of the things denoted by the words, as in "tat tvam asi" ("thou art That").

The objection regarding knowledge and object: "Knowledge is never without an object." Because in our experience, all knowledge occurs regarding some object. If there were no object, there could only be indeterminate cognition—since determination requires an object.

The response: This assertion is unacceptable. For without an object, neither the origination, persistence, nor secondary cognition of knowledge is impossible.

1. Regarding origination: If you say origination of knowledge without an object is impossible—this is incorrect. For knowledge (actually Brahman) in its true nature is not something originated. And even if we assume knowledge is originated, an object is not indispensable. For knowledge (true or false) can arise through direct perception, inference and other valid means, or through counterfeit means. Nowhere is it stated that every knowledge must be created by an object. In inference, for instance, knowledge occurs even without direct perception of the object.

2. Regarding persistence: One cannot say that knowledge cannot endure without an object. For the object is not the substrate of knowledge. If you say the object is knowledge's substrate, then the object ceases to be an "object" and becomes the "knower."

3. Regarding secondary knowledge: If you say secondary knowledge is impossible without an object—because the second knowledge knows the first by taking it as object; this too is incorrect. For knowledge is self-presentative. It needs nothing else to make itself known. If you say knowledge is not self-presentative, then a second knowledge is needed, for the second a third is needed, thus infinite regress occurs. This means knowledge would remain entirely unproven, and the world would be completely dark—nothing could be known at all.

If you say—"Some unknown knowledge proves the object," then that unknown knowledge would be like a maya—like human horns. For there is no way to prove its existence (since you yourself acknowledge it as unknown).

Why is an object necessary? If you accept—"A second knowledge is needed to know knowledge," then why is an object needed? Knowledge of the object alone suffices. The objection arises: "No, not general knowledge without an object, but determinate knowledge is needed—where knowledge is determined by the object."

Refutation: This objection too is baseless and arises from lack of deep understanding of knowledge's self-determining nature. Just as in other philosophical systems categories like "universal" (jāti), "quality" (guṇa), "action" (karma) etc. are considered independently recognized and self-revealed, similarly in Advaita philosophy knowledge too is viewed as a self-differenced (self-distinguished) reality. This means that to understand knowledge's existence and nature, no mediation by anything else is required; knowledge is its own revealer.

"Universal" (jāti), "quality" (guṇa), "action" (karma) etc. are important categories of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.

1. Universal (Jāti)—Generality or Universal—the common similarity or identical form that exists in many individuals is the universal. A universal is a kind of identical property by which many objects belong to one class. Example: "horse," "elephant," "cow"—all are different, but they share a commonality—"animal." This "animalness" is the universal. Similarly, the "potness" in all pots, "tableness" in all tables—these are universals.

2. Quality (Guṇa)—that characteristic which inheres in a substance but does not itself perform separate action. Quality helps identify the substance. Examples: color, form, smell, taste, touch. Knowledge, pleasure-pain, number, measure etc. are also considered qualities. Like: "The pot is white," "Water is cold"—here white color and coldness are qualities.

3. Action (Karma)—Action—the dynamic state of substance that brings about change. Action is that by which an object changes place or condition. Examples: motion (moving, running), ascent (rising), descent (falling), expansion (swelling), contraction (shrinking). Like: "Bird is flying," "Human is walking"—this flying, walking is action.

The concept of self-determination is a fundamental basis of Advaita Vedanta. It signifies that knowledge not only illuminates objects but is also self-luminous. Just as a lamp dispels darkness and also reveals itself, similarly knowledge removes ignorance and proves its own existence. This self-revelation or self-establishment is an inherent characteristic of knowledge, which distinguishes it from other unreal or impermanent objects.

Therefore, denying knowledge's self-determination is not reasonable, for this is a well-established wisdom of philosophy. This is not a relative or dependent concept, but highlights knowledge's inseparable relationship with absolute being. In this context, attempting to prove knowledge through external means is meaningless, for knowledge itself is the source and support of all proof. Knowledge is always self-presentative. Objects are not indispensable for it. Taking object-dependent knowledge as true is a false notion.

The opponent's statement: Still (the opponent says), from knowledge's presence itself we infer the object's existence. For the universally accepted rule is—wherever there is knowledge, there exists some knowable object.

Advaita's refutation: No, no such universal rule can be proven. These two do not coexist in one place—knowledge's location is mental, while the knowable object is external; unlike smoke and fire (which are found in the same place), these do not abide in one location. Even their contemporaneous coexistence is absent—for we also obtain knowledge of past or future. Therefore, it is not proven that knowledge and object always remain together. Therefore, there is no proof that knowledge and knowable object are different.

This visible world—conscious and inert, whatever it may be—is nothing but consciousness or knowledge. Just as in dreams everything is merely knowledge (Brahman or consciousness), but appears in various forms as knowledge and knowable objects—similarly in the waking state too this universe—conscious and inert all—is actually nothing but Brahman.

The thread-cloth example—if cloth is conceived without thread, then cloth becomes entirely non-existent. Similarly this world too, whose "existence" is merely appearance (esse = percipi—existence means being perceived—To exist is to be perceived.), becomes void without the Self (Brahman, consciousness).

The rope-snake example—just as in darkness a rope is mistaken for a snake, similarly when the mind is deluded, the Self itself appears as this world.

Self-dependent creation—taking only the Self as support, the origination, persistence and dissolution of this appearance-dependent world repeatedly occurs—this is the reflected world. Only Brahman—who has no second, who is inner-blissful (realizing Self-bliss by turning inward), pure, free from sin and defect—in His reflection this three-fold world (whose existence is merely appearance) is manifested.

Here the Advaitic position is—the world is not a separate reality. World means only the appearance of knowledge (consciousness). Dream, mirage, rope-snake, cloth-thread—all examples prove that there is no independent world apart from Brahman.