# The Vedas and Brahman: Eight আমরা এতদিনে বুঝেছি যে বেদের সাক্ষ্য অনুযায়ী ব্রহ্ম নির্বিশেষ। তিনি নিরাকার, নিরঞ্জন, নিরাবরণ, চিৎ-মাত্র। সকল বিশেষণ তাঁর সম্বন্ধে অপ্রযোজ্য। তিনি সাকার বা নিরাকার নন, নন তিনি সচ্চিদানন্দ বা অন্য কোনো বিশেষণে বিশিষ্ট। শুধু তিনি আছেন—অনন্ত, অসীম, চিন্ময়। By now we have come to understand that according to the testimony of the Vedas, Brahman is without attributes. He is formless, stainless, unveiled—pure consciousness itself. All distinctions and qualifications fail in his regard. He is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, neither sat-chit-ananda nor qualified by any other designation. He simply *is*—infinite, boundless, luminous with consciousness. এখন প্রশ্ন জাগে: যদি তিনি এমন নির্বিশেষ, তাহলে আমাদের উপাসনা কি করে সম্ভব? নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্মের প্রতি আমরা কীভাবে ভক্তি নিবেদন করব? আমাদের প্রার্থনা কার কাছে ধরব? Here a question arises: if he is truly without attributes, how can worship be possible? How can we offer devotion to the attribute-less Brahman? To whom shall we direct our prayers? এই প্রশ্নের উত্তর খুব সহজ নয়। বেদের মন্ত্রগুলো এই বিপর্যয়ের মধ্যে একটি অদ্ভুত সমন্বয় করেছে। তারা একদিকে বলে যে ব্রহ্ম নির্বিশেষ, অন্যদিকে তারা বলে যে সেই ব্রহ্মই সবকিছু। সেই নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্ম থেকেই এই বিশেষবহুল জগৎ উদ্ভূত। তাই পৃথিবী, মানুষ, দেবতা—সবই তাঁর রূপ, সবই তাঁর লীলা। The answer is not simple. The Vedic hymns have wrought a strange reconciliation within this paradox. On one hand, they declare that Brahman is without attributes; on the other, they assert that this very Brahman is all things. From that attribute-less Brahman springs forth this manifold and particularized world. Therefore, the earth, humanity, the gods—all are his forms, all are his play. আর এখানেই উপাসনা সম্ভব হয়। যখন আমরা দেবতার পূজা করি, যখন আমরা প্রকৃতিকে ভালোবাসি, যখন আমরা মানুষের সেবা করি—তখন আমরা প্রকৃতপক্ষে সেই নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্মের উপাসনাই করছি। কারণ সেই নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্ম সবখানে আছেন, সব রূপে আছেন, সব ভাবে আছেন। And here lies the possibility of worship. When we honour the divine, when we love nature, when we serve humanity—we are in truth worshipping that very attribute-less Brahman. For that attribute-less Brahman dwells everywhere, in every form, in every way. এই সমন্বয়ের মধ্যে রয়েছে গভীর দর্শনগত সত্য। নির্বিশেষ ও বিশেষ, পরম ও সীম, অসীম ও সসীম—এ সবই একই সত্তার দুই দিক মাত্র। সেই নির্বিশেষকে বিশেষ করে দেখা, অসীমকে সীম মধ্যে আবদ্ধ করে দেখা—এটি শুধুমাত্র আমাদের দৃষ্টির সীমাবদ্ধতা। বাস্তবে কোনো দ্বৈত নেই। সবকিছুই এক, সবকিছুই ব্রহ্ম। Within this reconciliation lies a profound philosophical truth. The attribute-less and the attributed, the transcendent and the finite, the infinite and the limited—these are but two aspects of one reality. To see the attribute-less as attributed, to confine the infinite within the finite—this is only the limitation of our perception. In truth, there is no duality. All is one; all is Brahman. এই বোধের নাম অদ্বৈত বা অ-দ্বৈতবাদ। এটি বেদের চূড়ান্ত শিক্ষা। এই বোধেই নিহিত রয়েছে ব্রহ্মজ্ঞান বা আত্মজ্ঞান। এবং এই জ্ঞানই মানুষকে মুক্তি দেয়। This vision is called Advaita, or non-dualism. It is the ultimate teaching of the Vedas. Within this understanding lies the knowledge of Brahman, or self-realization. And it is this knowledge alone that liberates humanity.

Again it is said: "Why should we study the Vedas? Why should we perform sacrifices?"—in such places, the renunciation of sacrifice and the like is spoken of. Therefore, the true purpose of the statement "Only after discharging the three debts does knowledge arise" (Manusmriti, 6.35)—is this: the person who has entered the householder's stage, yet thinks, "My goal will be fulfilled through self-knowledge alone," and on that account remains indifferent to discharging the three debts (performing the prescribed sacrifices)—if he does not complete them, he commits sin. And that very sin becomes an obstacle to the dawn of knowledge. To put it plainly: not all ordinances of scripture lead to the path of knowledge—this is not a universal principle. In some texts the renunciation of sacrifice is taught, in others the performance of sacrifice—both are spoken of according to context. Therefore, "without discharging the three debts, knowledge will not arise"—this is a rule applicable to the householder; but it is not a universal truth.

According to another view, sacrifices and the like—whose fruits (such as the attainment of heaven) fulfill their own purpose—are nonetheless held to be auxiliary aids within knowledge, according to the principle of "the unity of the dual and non-dual." As the Shruti has declared—"Brahmins through the study of the Vedas and sacrifice seek to know That" (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, 4.4.22). Yet here sacrifice and the like are aids to knowledge—in the sense that they help to manifest knowledge, not in producing some separate fruit; just as the prāyāja ritual plays a role in bringing about the fruit; for there is no fruit beyond knowledge.

Prāyāja is a subsidiary ritual (sub-ritual) of Vedic sacrifice. Before the main sacrifice begins, five small oblations are offered into the fire, and these are called prāyāja. Its meaning: "Prā + āyāja" → the initial or preliminary oblation. These prepare and purify for the main sacrifice (such as the new and full moon sacrifice, the agnishtoma, and so forth). Without the prāyāja, the main sacrifice is considered incomplete. These are auxiliary in making the sacrifice efficacious, but they themselves produce no independent fruit. Ordinarily, oblations are offered into the fire for five deities: Agni, Soma, Savitur, Saraswati, and Pushan. These five deities symbolize sacrificial power, the power of life, and the power of knowledge. Prāyāja is the small oblation performed at the beginning of sacrifice. These are subsidiary to the main rite; just as life cannot subsist without warmth in the body, so too the main sacrifice does not attain completion without the prāyāja.

Now, let us consider the acceptable view concerning "purification"—sacrifices and the like purify the human being, and that very purification makes him worthy of attaining knowledge. This is why the Smriti states: "Knowledge arises in the pure person." And in the Brahma Sutra as well (3.4.32) it is said—"The sacrifices pertaining to the ashrams must surely be performed, for they are ordained in scripture." Though sacrifice has its own fruit (such as the attainment of heaven), these actually aid in the manifestation of knowledge. There is no supreme fruit other than knowledge. Sacrifice bestows inner purification upon the human being, and it is in the pure person that the knowledge of self dawns. This is why scripture says—the sacrifices of the ashram-dharma must surely be performed.

Objection: Knowledge arises from the valid means of direct knowledge; therefore, those direct means that are amenable to practice—such as control of mind, control of the senses, and so forth—are the special means, and whatever removes the restlessness of the mind should certainly be pursued. For only that person—who practices meditation with a peaceful mind—attains pure knowledge. Sacrifice and the like are not necessary here; for knowledge is attained through meditation alone, without sacrifice.

Refutation: This is true; thus those who observe celibacy throughout life seek to attain pure knowledge in this very way, even without sacrifices. Yet there is a difference in terms of time—when special means are present, knowledge is revealed quickly or very quickly; and when those means are absent, it is revealed slowly or very slowly.

Therefore it has been said—”All actions, including sacrificial rites, have their utility, for the scriptures prescribe sacrifice and the like; as in the case of a horse.” (Brahma Sutras, 3.4.26) The meaning here is—although knowledge can be obtained through meditation alone, all sacrificial acts still have their necessity, because the Upanishad declares—”Through sacrifice, through charity…” (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, 4.4.22).

Let me explain this with an example. One can reach a village even without a horse, but to reach it swiftly and effortlessly, a horse is taken. Similarly, knowledge might perhaps be attainable through meditation alone, but when sacrificial rites and other aids are present, it is acquired more rapidly and easily. Meditation alone may suffice to dispel ignorance, but it takes considerable time. Sacrifice, charity, celibacy, and sense-restraint—these are auxiliary means that accelerate and ease the attainment of knowledge.

**Objection:** One might argue thus—Brahman is by nature knowledge itself; knowledge is not something distinct from Brahman; and since that Brahman is eternal, it cannot be newly created or produced by anything else. If this is so, why is there need for anything further?

**Refutation:** The answer to this is as follows—just as a jewel’s color is obscured by some covering beside it, and to reveal its true color that covering must be removed; we must understand the matter in the same way here. The jewel’s original color is not actually destroyed by the covering; nor does a new color come into being when the covering is removed. Again, if we suppose that after passing through many moments of different colors (such as red), the previous white color suddenly comes into being anew—this is impossible without a cause. As when fire is extinguished and wood is once turned to charcoal, that charcoal does not become new wood again.

The jewel’s color was never actually produced—it was merely concealed by the covering; therefore, to reveal it, the covering alone must be removed. Similarly, the nature of the Self is not some newly created thing; rather, it stands revealed the moment ignorance’s veil is removed. Brahman, the Self, is eternal, knowledge by nature, not newly produced. The authentic nature manifests itself only when the covering of ignorance is lifted.

**Objection:** Very well, let it be so; but the knowledge that a person seeks to attain—knowledge concerning the nature of the jewel—requires something. And that knowledge, which is distinct from the jewel itself, is surely what can be acquired. In this case, the person’s effort is truly for the sake of knowledge.

**Refutation:** Then the question arises—is knowledge sought for its own sake, or for determining the nature of an object? The answer is that knowledge is generally not sought for its own sake, because all our activities are bound up with objects. Activity does not depend solely on correct knowledge; it also depends on false knowledge. If it is said that knowledge is sought in order to know the nature of an object, then our quest for knowledge is actually for the object’s sake. Knowledge brings about no change in the object; for there is no direct connection between knowledge and object. Proximity or coexistence occurs everywhere, but that is not a genuine relation. A pen and book lying on a table exist together, yet there is no real connection or relation between the pen and book. Similarly, though knowledge and object may appear to occur side by side, knowledge brings about no change in the object. Moreover, if knowledge did effect a change in the object, it would be equally manifest to everyone.

It is also impossible for knowledge to effect any change upon an object that has already perished or that has not yet come into being.

Thus, as a jewel is not truly veiled, yet appears to be veiled, and as if the removal of any veil would reveal its true form—so too the reality of the Self is not truly veiled, yet seems to be veiled, and appears to require effort for its revelation. The Self/Brahman is always, in fact, manifest; it is only ignorance that makes it seem hidden. Knowledge creates no new thing; it merely dispels this very condition of “seeming to be veiled.”

‘Relation’ is a stable or transient connection between two substances. It is fundamentally of two kinds:

Samavāya, or inseparable union, wherein one cannot exist without the other. Example: quality and substance (color and matter), part and whole (hand and body). These are inseparable relations.

Saṃyoga, or temporary union, occurs when two distinct substances come together from without. Example: a pen placed on a table, a stone in contact with earth. This is a transient and separable relation.

Now we turn to the matter of knowledge and object. The question arises: is there any relation between knowledge (cognition) and object? If we say samavāya—then knowledge cannot exist without the object; but in reality, knowledge is merely the “revealer,” while the object stands independently in its own right, so ‘inseparable union’ does not apply here. If we say saṃyoga—then knowledge and object are merely temporarily joined, like pen and table; but this too is incorrect, for knowledge does not bring about any external contact with the object. Therefore, the Nyāya school holds: between knowledge and object there is only co-existence, not any genuine relation (samavāya or saṃyoga).

A few more examples will clarify the matter. Smoke and fire: a causal relation—inseparable union. Color and flower: samavāya—for here color cannot subsist independently. Moon and cloud: mere co-existence—no union. Knowledge and object: like co-existence itself—no genuine union. “Proximity or co-existence occurs everywhere, but that is not genuine union”—meaning: mere side-by-side existence does not constitute samavāya or saṃyoga. The knowledge-object relation is not a genuine union, merely co-existence. Knowledge does not alter the object; it merely reveals it.