The Light of the Vedas on Non-Dualism: Eighteen

Refutation: The nature of avidyā (ignorance) in Advaita philosophy and its relationship with Brahman constitutes a profound and subtle inquiry. The Vivaraṇa school raises a significant objection: if Brahman is both the locus and object of avidyā, then this contradicts Brahman's purity and non-dual nature. This objection essentially employs dualistic reasoning from the empirical level—such as the coexistence of light and darkness—arguing that just as light and darkness cannot exist together, neither can Brahman and avidyā coexist.

However, Advaita's response approaches this objection from an entirely different perspective. Advaitins maintain that avidyā is not some material darkness. It is 'anirvacanīya' (inexplicable), meaning it can be called neither existent nor non-existent. Avidyā is fundamentally ignorance, which is removed by knowledge. It is neither a substance nor an entity that could establish a dualistic relationship with Brahman. Brahman, through its own power known as 'māyā,' veils itself. This veiling is not a real covering but rather a state of ignorance that does not affect Brahman's ultimate reality. Just as clouds may obscure the sun without altering the sun's existence or brilliance, avidyā causes no transformation in Brahman's essential nature.

According to this explanation, the apparent inconsistency at the empirical level—that Brahman is called the locus of avidyā—has no effect upon ultimate reality. When it is said that Brahman is the locus of avidyā, this does not mean that avidyā resides within Brahman or constitutes Brahman's attribute. Rather, it signifies that Brahman is the substratum or foundation of avidyā. Avidyā is merely an appearance superimposed upon Brahman, which is removed by knowledge. This position also helps protect Advaita from Berkeley's subjective idealism. In Berkeley's philosophy, the world's continuity depends upon individual consciousness, which calls the world's existence into question with the individual's dissolution. But in Advaita philosophy, the world's continuity is ensured by the 'mūla-avidyā' (primordial ignorance) controlled by Īśvara (God). Here, Īśvara is the locus of avidyā, and he is the sustainer and controller of this world. Īśvara is saguṇa Brahman, the agent of creation, preservation, and dissolution. He is not affected by avidyā; rather, avidyā is his very power. This primordial avidyā is the root source of all individual beings' personal avidyā.

Thus, in Advaita philosophy, avidyā does not contradict Brahman's existence; rather, it is the manifestation of a power that further illuminates Brahman's glory. As long as ignorance persists, the world and its diversity appear real. But when self-knowledge is attained, this avidyā is dispelled, and Brahman alone manifests as ultimate reality.

3. The Inconceivability of Nature (Svarūpa Anupapatti): In Advaita Vedanta philosophy, a profound and fundamental question arises concerning the nature of avidyā. What is meant by "avidyā" here, and what is its true nature? This question occupies the center of philosophical inquiry, for the foundation of Advaitavāda depends largely upon determining avidyā's nature. This objection can be analyzed in two principal parts:

If avidyā is real (sat): If avidyā is acknowledged as real or ultimately existent like Brahman, then it challenges the fundamental basis of Advaitavāda. According to Advaita, Brahman alone is ultimate truth, and nothing else possesses independent ultimate existence. If avidyā is real, then another ultimate entity beyond Brahman is acknowledged, which contradicts Advaita's principle of "ekamevādvitīyam" (one without a second). In this case, duality or difference-non-difference arises between Brahman and avidyā, which destroys Advaita's central thesis. This doctrine would then lean toward dualism or qualified non-dualism rather than remaining non-dual.

If avidyā is unreal (asat): On the other hand, if avidyā is considered completely unreal or non-existent (like "a barren woman's son" or "sky-flowers"), then another problem appears. Something that is completely non-existent cannot be experienced or directly known. Just as a barren woman's son does not exist in reality, no real experience of it is possible. But we experience the world's existence, we undergo worldly suffering. If avidyā were completely unreal, then the world and all worldly experience would become unreal, and our empirical experience would be impossible. This argument denies avidyā's efficacy and the experiential reality of the world created by it.

In both these cases, fundamental questions arise concerning avidyā's "ontological status" or existential position. To resolve this objection, Advaita Vedanta describes a special nature of avidyā, where avidyā is called "sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa" or "anirvacanīya." This means that avidyā can be called neither completely real nor completely unreal. It is not real like Brahman's ultimate existence, nor is it unreal like a barren woman's son. Avidyā is such a power that, superimposed upon Brahman, makes the world appear real until its cessation occurs through self-knowledge. This "inexplicability" is an important concept of Advaita Vedanta that attempts to resolve the inconceivability of avidyā's nature.

Refutation: Advaita's fundamental response is—avidyā is anirvacanīya (inexplicable). This is a third state—falsity—which is proven by experience (hence not asat), but destructible by knowledge (hence not sat). It falls into neither sat nor asat categories, but differs from both. This position is supported by the illustration of 'snake in rope'—though the snake is perceived, it is neither different from nor real in relation to its substratum (rope), and when knowledge arises, it is destroyed. Like the snake, avidyā too is an illusion that appears real before knowledge but is removed by knowledge.

4. The Inconceivability of Cause and Cessation: If avidyā is beginningless (anādi), what is its cause? And how is the termination of something beginningless possible? If something has no beginning, how can it end?

Refutation: Advaita responds that cause-effect relationships apply only at the empirical level. Beginningless simply means that whose origin cannot be known, but this does not mean it is indestructible. Beginningless ignorance in the form of impression is certainly destroyed by self-knowledge or vidyā. When vidyā arises, ignorance is destroyed, just as darkness disappears with the advent of light. This process of destruction does not seek to explain ignorance merely through its nature, but proves it through results. Even if ignorance is beginningless, its destruction is possible because it is destroyed not spontaneously, but through knowledge.

5. The Knowledge Problem: How will a being immersed in ignorance attain Brahman-knowledge? Why should knowing the world's falsity lead to knowledge of Brahman? If the individual is covered by ignorance, how is it possible to gain knowledge by piercing through that veil?

Refutation of the Objection: Advaita claims that for attaining Brahman-knowledge, knowledge of the world's falsity is not necessary; rather, knowing one's true nature (ātman) is essential. Brahman-knowledge does not give knowledge about the world's falsity; rather, it destroys ignorance and reveals the ātman's nature. Knowing the world's falsity is the result of attaining Brahman-knowledge, for when knowledge of Brahman arises, the question of other things' existence does not arise. This process is not acquisition of something new, but realization of what has always existed; that is, self-knowledge is not knowing the self anew, but realizing existing truth and removing ignorance's veil.

Anupapatti is fundamentally a logical concept used in Indian philosophy. Its literal meaning is—"that whose upapatti (rational explanation/proof) is not possible." In philosophy, 'anupapatti' means—the impossibility of establishing any doctrine or statement through logic; that is, when no logical explanation can be constructed in favor of a specific claim or proposition, it is said to be anupapanna or afflicted by anupapatti. Particularly in Advaita Vedanta's refutation-counter-refutation process, the term 'anupapatti' is repeatedly used. If the opponent's statement cannot be logically explained or becomes self-contradictory, it is said—"this view falls into anupapatti."

If someone says—"fire is cold," then there is no rational explanation or experientially established proof for this. Therefore this claim is anupapatti. In Advaita philosophy it is said—the world originates from avidyā. If someone questions, "avidyā is inert, how can it create?"—then if a rational explanation cannot be given in response, that objection will be considered anupapatti. In brief, anupapatti = a state/objection that cannot be established through logic or proof.

The four types of "anupapatti" concerning avidyā in Advaita Vedanta (which Śaṅkara's commentary and later ācāryas have discussed) I shall explain in detail:

1. Āśraya-anupapatti (Locus Problem)—Question: Where does avidyā reside? Who is its substratum?

If it is said that avidyā's substratum is Brahman, then the problem: Brahman is omniscient, self-luminous, and beyond avidyā. How can avidyā reside in it? If it is said that avidyā's substratum is the individual, then the problem: The individual is itself produced by avidyā. The concept of individual is possible only when avidyā exists. Then where was avidyā before? Therefore, avidyā's specific substratum cannot be determined—this is āśraya-anupapatti.

2. Viṣaya-anupapatti (Object Problem)—Question: What does avidyā actually veil? What is its object?

If it is said that avidyā veils Brahman, then the problem: Brahman is self-luminous; avidyā cannot veil it. If it is said that avidyā veils the individual, then the problem: The individual is manifested only as avidyā's result. Therefore the very concept of "veiling" becomes meaningless. Hence avidyā's true object cannot be determined—this is viṣaya-anupapatti.

3. Pralaya-anupapatti (Dissolution Problem)—Question: During mahāpralaya (cosmic dissolution) when everything is absorbed, where does avidyā remain?

If it is said that avidyā does not remain then, then the problem: How did the created world begin again after dissolution? If it is said that avidyā remains even then, then the problem: During dissolution all limitations and modifications are absorbed—then with whom did avidyā remain connected? Therefore, avidyā's position during dissolution cannot be logically determined—this is pralaya-anupapatti.

4. Upayogī-anupapatti (Utility Problem)—Question: If avidyā exists, how is it effective? How is its utility understood?

If it is said that avidyā is effective though false, then the problem: How is the efficacy of something false possible? If avidyā is said to be real, then the problem: Then Brahman's non-difference principle would be broken. That is, avidyā is never real, yet when called false, its efficacy cannot be denied. This contradiction is called upayogī-anupapatti.

The four anupapattis concerning avidyā in Advaita Vedanta are—
Āśraya-anupapatti → Inconsistency in determining avidyā's substratum.
Viṣaya-anupapatti → Inconsistency in determining avidyā's object of veiling.
Pralaya-anupapatti → Inconsistency concerning avidyā's existence during mahāpralaya.
Upayogī-anupapatti → Inconsistency concerning avidyā's efficacy or utility.