The Light of the Vedas on Advaita: Twenty-Three

The Nature of Cause-Effect Relations and the Role of Ignorance:

In Advaita Vedānta philosophy, the cause-effect relationship is not understood in the conventional sense. Conventionally, we believe that specific materials give birth to specific effects—clay creates a pot, thread creates cloth. But according to Advaita, this notion demands profound examination.

Advaita's position is that all effects (such as pots, cloth, furniture, houses, even our bodies and minds) are not due to any particular material cause, but rather arise from avidyā. Avidyā means ignorance or māyā. It is that power which veils the unity of Brahman and creates the illusion of multiplicity. For instance, when we see a pot, we think clay is its cause. When we see cloth, we know thread to be its cause. But Advaitins compare these notions to the dream state. In dreams, the pot or cloth we see has no need for the notion of clay or thread, because dream phenomena have no real foundation. During dreams, neither clay nor thread is present there, and worldly cause-effect relations do not apply. In exactly the same way, the cause-effect relations of the waking state are also creations of avidyā. That is, everything we perceive as cause and effect actually manifests within the veil of avidyā. These worldly relations are relative truths, not absolute truth.

Brahman Alone is Real: The Mystery of Avidyā and Perception

The fundamental basis of Advaita philosophy is "Brahman is real, the world is false." Based on this truth, it can be said that everything other than Brahman—whether knowable (that which can be known) or knowledge (the process of knowing)—is the result of avidyā. This means our entire experiential world, its objects, and the framework of our epistemology are all māyic manifestations of avidyā. The being of all these knowables and knowledge depends solely on perception (like the Irish philosopher George Berkeley's view—esse est percipi—being (esse) is being perceived/experienced (percipi)), meaning their existence depends on perception—"to be is to be perceived." What is not perceived has no real existence—from this perspective, as long as we perceive something, only then does it exist. When avidyā is removed, this perception also ceases, and only Brahman remains.

("Pratīti" (Sanskrit: pratīti) means—perception / conception / cognition / perception—the birth of knowledge / the presence of experience / the perception of something—when any object appears or manifests in our consciousness, that is called pratīti.

In Nyāya philosophy: Pratīti means the arising of knowledge—the knowledge by which we become aware of an object or event. For example, the knowledge that arises in knowing "this is a pot" is pratīti.

In Buddhist philosophy: "Pratītya-samutpāda" (pratītya-samutpāda) means "arising in dependence upon." Here pratīti means "dependence." For example: "When ignorance exists, formations arise; when formations exist, consciousness-stream arises..." etc.

In Advaita Vedānta: Pratīti generally refers to habitual false perception. For example, seeing a rope as a snake = false pratīti. Mistaking an earthen vessel for gold = erroneous pratīti. These are avidyā-born pratītis.

For instance, sensory pratīti: seeing a flower with the eyes; mental pratīti: experiencing in dreams; false pratīti: the perception of water in a mirage.)

Support for this idea is found in the declaration of sage Vasiṣṭha, stated in Yoga-vāsiṣṭha Nirvāṇa-prakaraṇa (6.20): "Everything arises from avidyā; they are ephemeral like bubbles; and ultimately dissolve into the great ocean of knowledge (that is, Brahman)." This metaphor is extremely significant. Just as bubbles arise from the ocean and merge back into the ocean, so too does the world and all its names and forms arise from Brahman and return to Brahman. Bubbles are transitory and fragile, but the ocean is eternal and unchanging. Similarly, worldly objects are transitory and illusory, but Brahman is eternal and real.

The Opposition's Objection and Advaita's Position: This radical claim of Advaita philosophy has naturally faced objections from other philosophical schools.

The Opposition's Objection: If Advaitins deny clay, thread, etc. as real causes of pots or cloth, then skeptics too must rely on certain inferences. That is, when something is denied, there must be some logic or evidence behind it. Based on this reasoning, the opposition believes that cause-effect relations are real. If cause-effect relations are accepted as real, then how can it be proven that avidyā is the cause of the world, when there is no confirmatory instance for this? That is, we see no example where avidyā directly causes an object, as we see clay being made into a pot. The opposition expresses doubt about this concept called 'avidyā' because no direct evidence of it catches their experience.

Advaita's Position: In response to this objection, the Advaita side firmly declares that the senses are not instruments of knowledge, because both knowledge and the knowable are born of avidyā. Here 'senses' refers not only to the five sense organs, but also to mind and intellect, which acquire worldly knowledge. According to Advaita, whatever we know and about which we know—all is māyā of avidyā. Our sense-derived knowledge, our rationalist thinking—everything is confined within the bounds of avidyā. Therefore, avidyā cannot be judged by sense-derived evidence or worldly logic, because that judging process itself is part of avidyā.

Advaitins emphatically state that the cause-effect relations of pot-clay or cloth-thread are also illusions created by avidyā. The cause-effect relations we see according to our worldly experience are not ultimate truth, but manifestations of avidyā. To transcend this relative truth and reach absolute truth, the veil of avidyā must be unveiled. Only Brahman is real. Everything else is like bubbles created by avidyā, which are transitory and ultimately merge into Brahman. This bubble metaphor is extremely important in Advaita philosophy, explaining the difference between the transitory illusory world and eternal Brahman. Just as bubbles arise from the ocean and merge back into the ocean, so all names and forms of the world arise from Brahman and return to Brahman. This unifies the cycle of birth, existence, and dissolution with Brahman.

The Opposition's Deeper Objection and Advaita's Crisis: The question may arise—if avidyā is said to be the cause of the world, must we accept cause-effect relations as real? If we don't accept it, then we cannot speak of avidyā's causation either. If we do accept it, then we must also accept the inference methods of joint presence-absence (anvaya-vyatireka) etc. (used in determining general causes) as reliable evidence.

According to this method, when a cause is present, an effect occurs, and when the cause is absent, the effect does not occur. Because there is no other method for proving causation. Therefore, when causes are determined by this inference method in cases like pot-clay, cloth-thread, etc., it is inappropriate to deny clay, thread, etc. while accepting avidyā as a cause. The opposition is trying to show that Advaitins are saying cause-effect relations are false on one hand, while presenting avidyā as the cause of the world on the other, which is a self-contradiction. If cause-effect relations themselves are false, then how can the cause-effect relationship between avidyā and the world be true?

Again, one who says avidyā is the cause of the world should be asked—is avidyā the sole cause, or does it work in combination with karmic results (adṛṣṭa), God, and other general causes? If it is said that avidyā is the sole cause—this cannot be accepted. Because diverse effects cannot arise from a single cause. The diverse effects seen in the world cannot arise from just one cause. Moreover, avidyā is inert (unconscious), so it cannot be effective without conscious support (like God's will). Inert matter cannot independently produce effects. Again, if it is said that avidyā is a cause only in combination with karmic results, God, etc.—then there is still a problem. Because then, since diverse effects can be explained by these various causes, what is the special need to consider avidyā as a cause? If the world's diversity can be explained through God or karmic results, then the additional concept of avidyā becomes unnecessary. This violates the principle of 'simplicity' (lāghava).

The opposition further argues—thus it is proven that the senses and other human proofs, and the preliminary portions of the Vedas (which speak of obtaining sons, cattle, heaven through sacrifices, etc.)—all are reliable. If Advaitins deny the reliability of human proofs (perception, inference, etc.) and the preliminary portions of the Vedas (karma-kāṇḍa), then what view can be adopted? Because this places humans in opposition to both practical experience (perceived through the senses) and the Vedas (considered the ultimate authority).

The opposition claims that Advaita's position conflicts with common worldly experience and Vedic tradition. Therefore, the opposition concluded—the claim that "avidyā is the sole cause of the world" is hasty and ill-considered. In their view, this is merely a philosophical speculation, not based on established evidence. These objections challenge Advaita Vedānta to remain coherent within its own logic. In response, Advaitins establish śruti (Vedānta/Upaniṣads) as the ultimate authority, and highlight the limitations of logic and experience. They say avidyā can only be described as 'inexplicable' (anirvacanīya), meaning it cannot be explained as either 'existing' or 'non-existing,' because it is neither real like Brahman, nor unreal like void. It is superimposed on Brahman, but does not touch Brahman's reality.

The main point of contention here is that the Advaita side believes avidyā is the sole cause. The opponents of this doctrine challenge its cause-effect relationship. If cause-effect relations are accepted as real, then separately calling avidyā a cause is illogical. Rather, karmic results, God, etc. are sufficient. And if cause-effect relations themselves are denied, then calling avidyā a cause is completely groundless.

In response to this debate, the Advaita side says that no effect can be said to arise from something "previously existing," nor can it be said to arise from something "previously non-existing." The reason is that the very nature of cause-effect relationships is inexplicable—it ultimately reaches avidyā. Why does it reach there? Let me break it down.

Cause-Effect Relationship—Effect = result / produced object; Cause = that from which the effect arises; Example: Clay (cause) creates a pot (effect). In the world of human reason and experience, we always understand effects as dependent on causes—"this is the result of that."

But where is the problem in this?

When philosophy goes deep into analyzing the fundamental nature of cause-effect, it becomes apparent—was the effect already in the cause, or did it come later? If it was already in the cause, then what is the meaning of creation or something new happening? And if it was not there at all before, then how did something suddenly arise from nothing? This question cannot be definitively answered through logic.