The Lamp of Ignorance-Philosophy: Sixty-Seven

Substratum and Maya—According to Advaita, the world cannot sustain itself; its existence depends on Brahman. Brahman is the absolute, formless, self-luminous consciousness. Maya is that power of ignorance which causes names and forms to appear upon Brahman. Therefore, the world created by maya is a substratum-dependent illusion. Nothing can endure without Brahman, just as the illusion of a snake cannot exist without the rope. When self-knowledge dawns, this mayaic delusion dissolves—yet the substratum (Brahman) remains eternally present.

In Buddhist Madhyamaka philosophy, the proponent of emptiness-vision, Nagarjuna declares—"absence of inherent nature" (svabhāva-śūnyatā) means no entity or being exists independently within itself. But here there is no "substratum" or "Brahman." The world is not illusion; rather it arises through dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda). Where Advaita says—"behind error lies one ultimate reality," Buddhism says—"behind error nothing permanent remains—only the flow of relationships." Advaita is thus substratum-dependent monism, while Madhyamaka is substratum-denying relationalism.

Two different directions on the path of knowledge—Advaita's path: When this ignorance is removed, one sees that the world was maya, but Brahman alone is truth—"Brahma satyaṁ, jagat mithyā, jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ." Madhyamaka's path: When this ignorance is removed, one sees that the world is not any self-evident entity; everything is other-dependent, impermanent and empty. "Emptiness is wisdom, wisdom itself is liberation."

Advaita Vedanta's falsity and Madhyamaka Buddhism's inherent-emptiness—both seek to answer the same question in different languages—"This world we see, how much of it is real?" Advaita says: The world is not real, but the manifestation of one reality (Brahman). Buddhism says: The world is not independent, but real within relationships. Advaita wants to recognize the "substratum" behind maya, Buddhism wants to eliminate the very concept of "substratum."

According to Advaita—Maya is the false conception of existence, which dissolves in the light of knowledge, but ultimate truth (Brahman) remains unchangingly present. According to Buddhism—The world itself is other-dependent emptiness, where no permanent reality exists; only cause-effect, relationships and flow. Both paths teach—ultimate truth cannot be bound in language. One says—"Brahman is ineffable," the other says—"Emptiness is beyond expression." And, in the end—both their silences touch each other.

What does 'inherent-emptiness' mean? Madhyamaka says—whatever appears in the world has no independent, permanent, unchangeable "inherent nature" (svabhāva) within itself. If something could remain exactly the same forever, entirely on its own strength, without help from anything else, that would be "inherent nature." In reality, nothing like this exists—this is emptiness. Emptiness means the absence of independent inherent nature.

Why it's called 'empty': Condition-dependent arising—any event or thing appears when conditions (causes & conditions) come together, disappears when conditions break apart. Example: Echo—voice, distance, wall angles, air—without these conditions sound doesn't return. Echo "exists," this is practically true, but it has no independent source-being of its own; it's condition-dependent presence. Madhyamaka sees all phenomena in exactly this light: they appear—because causes exist; they persist—through causes; therefore they have no inherent essence.

Clear rejection of the 'substratum' concept—Advaita says, "The phenomenal world is maya; but there exists an ultimate substratum called Brahman, upon which this manifestation appears." Madhyamaka says, no such permanent substratum is needed at all. Because the reality of events lies—in the web of dependencies. "Emptiness" means this—events neither sustain themselves nor stand upon some separate eternal foundation; they arise in mutually dependent relationships.

Advaita gives the example—mistaking a rope for a snake in dim light. When knowledge comes, the "snake" delusion disappears, the rope (Brahman) remains. Madhyamaka says here, both 'rope' and 'snake'—are conceptual, dependently-designated names. Neither has any inherent, independent, unchangeable essence. We call it "rope" or "snake" based on context, part-whole relations, language, memory, senses—these conditions. Therefore the notion of a single, independent 'substratum' is itself unnecessary.

Epistemology arising from world-vision—two paths, two confidences. Advaita—maintains a conceptual realist confidence—universal concepts—Brahman/Atman—are real and ultimate substrata. Therefore it accepts hierarchical levels in knowledge:
1) Perception (sensory/mental perception),
2) Scripture/reasoning (scriptural knowledge, logic),
3) Ultimate Brahman-knowledge (direct spiritual realization)—where lower truths become "sublated," only Brahman-truth remains.

Madhyamaka/Buddhist—maintains a nominalist confidence—doesn't grant independent reality to universal/formal concepts; establishes nothing as separate being; accepts only dependent particulars—which arise through conditions. This refusal to grant reality to universals is Madhyamaka's philosophical foundation; therefore it denies inherent nature (intrinsic essence) in all phenomena; Brahman-like permanent substratum—that too is rejected.

The term Nominalism comes from Latin nomen (name). Its core idea is—there are no real, independent entities called "universals"; these are merely nominal—that is, labels created by human concepts or language. This theory played an important role in the medieval "Universals" debate. The question was—"Do universal concepts like 'humanity,' 'tree,' 'color' have real existence?" Three main positions emerged—

Realism: The core idea of realism is that universals or general concepts (such as 'humanity,' 'beauty,' 'redness') truly exist in reality. These are not merely products of our imagination, but exist independently in the real world. All the individual humans we see are merely parts of one eternal essence called "humanity." Like Plato's "Forms" or "Ideas"—the real world is their shadow or reflection. Advaita Vedanta is close to this view, because it states that behind all names and forms lies one ultimate essence, which is Brahman. Therefore according to realism, general concepts are not mere names of thought, but manifestations of ultimate truth.

Conceptualism: Conceptualism says—universals don't exist in the real world, but they exist as real mental concepts within the mind. When we see multiple individuals or objects, we form a general concept in our minds. For example, if you see 10 people, you know they are different, yet you say—"all are human"—because a general concept called 'humanity' forms in your mind. This 'humanity' is not any eternal essence, but a mental structure organized by intelligence. Aristotle and medieval thinker Abelard supported this view. They said universals are not real, but have a rational place in mental organization.

Nominalism: The core position of nominalism is—universals don't exist in reality, nor do they have any independent reality within the mind. These are merely convenient signs of language, nominal labels used for communication. In reality exist only separate objects—Ram, Ramesh, Rakhi, Ruby—such individual humans. There's no independent entity called "humanity"; we merely see their similar characteristics and give one name—"human." William of Ockham was the main proponent of this theory. According to him, only particular objects exist in reality, universals are merely names. Therefore nominalism says—"universal concepts" are not independent truths, but constructions of language, reflections of human mental or social needs.

Comparatively, realism believes universals really exist; conceptualism believes they are mental concepts; and nominalism believes they are merely linguistic signs. Realism seeks an ultimate essence, conceptualism emphasizes mental concepts, and nominalism rejects all essence and seeks meaning within relationships and names. Nominalism takes the most radical position here—"There's no single entity called 'humanity'; only separate humans exist. The word 'human' is merely a linguistic convenience for referring to them collectively."

Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy is nominalist in this sense—it rejects "universals" or "permanent essence" (svabhāva). Every object, thought or event arises dependently (pratītyasamutpāda). Therefore "soul," "world," "consciousness"—these are seen not as real independent entities, but as nominal signs based on dependency. For example, what we understand as "tree" is a collection of leaves, trunk, roots, water, light etc. But there's no independent real entity called "treeness." "Tree" is merely a nominal concept we apply to dependent parts.

Advaita Vedanta moves in exactly the opposite direction. There it's said—behind all change lies one ultimate universal reality—Brahman. That is, "one essence" really exists, whose manifestation is this world. Therefore, Advaita is essentialist or realist; Madhyamaka is nominalist. Advaita says—"Only one truth exists (Brahman)." Buddhism says—"No independent truth exists; everything is nominal relationship."

'Two truths' in Madhyamaka—but without 'substratum.' Madhyamaka philosophy says reality can be understood at two levels—one is conventional truth (practical truth), and the other is ultimate truth (final truth). However, nowhere in these two truths is there any permanent "substratum" or "ultimate foundation."

Conventional or practical truth is the level where we recognize and name things according to everyday language, society, customs and causality. At this level we say "rope," "snake," "I," "you"—these are practically true. Because through our senses, thoughts and social consensus these seem real within experience. But these are only language and context-dependent truths; that is, conventional or nominal truths.

Ultimate truth is the level where we see that all these designations or namings have no permanent inherent nature. "Rope" or "snake," "I" or "you"—none of these exist independently within themselves; they are formed depending on each other. What remains at this level is dependent-designation (prajñapti)—that is, only names or concepts created through relationships and conditions. Here there's no eternal entity or substratum.

Through these two truths Madhyamaka explains that truth is not fixed at any specific level. When context and dependency change, the form of "truth" also changes. Therefore nothing can be called ultimately true, because its existence depends on something else. Thus Madhyamaka philosophy teaches—everything is empty, because everything is relationship-dependent; and within these relationships the meaning and value of truth changes.

The nature of knowledge in Madhyamaka—relative and dependent. Madhyamaka philosophy says knowledge itself is also condition-dependent. Just as no object is independent within itself, similarly knowledge is not independent. The origin, applicability and limits of knowledge—all depend on context, experience, language and relationships. Therefore no knowledge can be ultimate, eternal or limitless. What seems true in one context may be false in another context.

For this reason according to Madhyamaka, the purpose of knowledge is not to find some "higher being" or "eternal reality." Rather the goal is to understand that—all concepts, all experiences, all existence are inherently empty (without inherent essence) and dependent (formed by conditions). When this realization comes completely, the mind understands—there's no permanent center in reality, only a web of relationships exists.