Here we present the opposing view: Charvaka philosophy and materialism of the body. Charvaka philosophy is a major atheistic school within Indian philosophy, one that does not accept the Vedas as authoritative. According to this system, perception alone is the sole source of knowledge, and that which cannot be perceived does not exist. The Charvakas are advocates of the four-element doctrine—they believe that all things originate from four fundamental substances: earth, water, fire, and air. Consciousness arises from the combination of these fundamental elements, but it is not a separate entity. According to their view, just as intoxication is produced by the combination of fermenting agents, so too does consciousness arise in the body from the combination of the four fundamental elements. Therefore, the body endowed with consciousness is the self—this is the doctrine of embodied selfhood. In various branches of Charvaka philosophy, the senses, the vital breath, or the mind have also been considered as the self.
The doctrine of embodied selfhood is a theory in Indian philosophy wherein the body itself is understood as the self. It represents an extreme form of materialism, one that does not acknowledge mind and consciousness as eternal entities separate from the body. Embodied selfhood is principally propagated by atheistic Charvaka philosophy—also called Lokayata. Its fundamental propositions are as follows:
1. The body is the self: According to embodied selfhood doctrine, there exists no separate or immortal entity called the self. The concept of "I" (Atman or self) that we employ refers merely to our material body.
2. Consciousness is a property of the body: Consciousness is not something apart from the body, but rather a particular quality or attribute of the material body itself. When the four fundamental elements of the body (earth, water, fire, and air) combine in a specific proportion, consciousness is produced—just as intoxication or inebriation arises from the mixture of particular substances.
3. Impermanence: Since consciousness originates from the body, when the body perishes, consciousness too perishes. Thus, rebirth, the afterlife, the fruit of actions, heaven and hell—all these are false.
4. Perception as evidence: This doctrine accepts only direct perception (that which can be directly observed by the senses) as valid. Since the self and the afterlife cannot be directly perceived, they are not true.
Within Charvaka philosophy, there existed certain schools that considered the nature of the self to be identical with various parts of the body. Though the main doctrine holds that "the body is the self," some subdivisions refined this further:
The gross body: Many believed the physical body itself is the self. The senses: Some Charvakas held that the senses themselves are the self (such as the eyes or the ears). The vital breath: Some considered the vital breath or life-force to be the self. The mind: Many held the mind to be the self.
Yet all of them shared a fundamental conclusion: the self is not an immortal or transcendent entity beyond the body.
Embodied selfhood is regarded as a principal opposing doctrine to the theistic philosophy of non-dualism (Advaita Vedanta), for the central claim of Advaita Vedanta is this: the body is illusion, and the self (Brahman) alone is the ultimate reality.
The term "ferment and suchlike" (kinva-adi) is a technical term used in Indian philosophy, particularly in Mimamsa philosophy. "Kinva" means some cause, agent, or activating force. For instance, in the production of wine, "kinva" is the fermenting agent that sets the entire process in motion. "Adi" means "and so forth" or "other related matters."
Mimamsa philosophy is one of the principal branches among the six orthodox schools (shaddarshana) of Indian philosophy. It is also called Purva Mimamsa or the philosophy of action and duty. The primary purpose of this philosophy is to correctly interpret the ritual portions of the Vedas (that is, those sections dealing with sacrifices and religious ceremonies) and to explicate the duties enjoined by Vedic tradition.
The word Mimamsa means "investigation" or "rational inquiry." The principal foundations and purposes of this philosophy are as follows:
1. The primary purpose—the investigation of dharma: The central aim of Mimamsa philosophy is to determine the true nature of dharma, or righteousness.
Here in ‘dharma’ does not mean the ethical duties of life, but rather primarily the Vedic-ordained actions or rituals. It holds the belief that proper performance of Vedic-prescribed religious acts (such as sacrifice, worship, and so forth) yields merit, and that very merit bestows heaven or auspicious fruits.
2. The Primary Authoritative Text—the Vedas: This philosophy accepts the Vedas (particularly the ritual section of the Vedas) as the ultimate and infallible authority. The Mīmāṃsakas believe that the Vedas were not composed by any individual; they are eternal (nitya) and self-validating (svatah-pramāṇa). For this reason, the sentences of the Vedas cannot be questioned—only interpreted.
3. Emphasis on Action: This philosophy grants supreme importance to action and ritual. It counsels humanity not to remain passive, but to actively fulfill religious duties in accordance with Vedic instruction. This is why the Mīmāṃsā philosophy is called the Mīmāṃsā of action (karma-mīmāṃsā).
4. Founder and Primary Text: The principal founder of Mīmāṃsā philosophy is the sage Jaimini. Its foundational work is Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā Sūtras.
Distinction from Uttara Mīmāṃsā: Mīmāṃsā philosophy is called Pūrva Mīmāṃsā because it concerns itself with the earlier section of the Vedas (the ritual portion). In contrast stands Uttara Mīmāṃsā, which addresses the later section of the Vedas (the knowledge section, or Upaniṣads) and is known as Vedānta philosophy. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā—discusses dharma, action, and Vedic rituals. Uttara Mīmāṃsā (Vedānta)—discusses Brahman, the self, and knowledge.
In brief, Mīmāṃsā philosophy is that branch which employs rational argument to establish the path toward obtaining religious fruit through Vedic ritual and duty. In Mīmāṃsā and Vedāntic discourse, the term “kinvādi” refers to those elements (causes, facilitators, or impelling forces) that activate action or play a role in producing the fruits of action. For example, in sacrifice—the sacrificial materials, mantras, the will of the sacrificer—these are called “kinvādi,” because they function as catalysts in producing that fruit of action, just as leaven is necessary for fermentation. Similarly, specific causes and elements are necessary for generating the fruit of sacrifice or Vedic action. The totality of these causes is termed “kinvādi.”
The Chārvākas’ doctrine encounters a fundamental logical error that has given rise to one of Indian philosophy’s most significant controversies. The foundation of this dispute is the question of the eternality or non-eternality of the self. If the self is non-eternal—that is, if it perishes along with the body—then it creates grave problems that shake not merely philosophical debate, but the very foundations of moral and social order. How so?
First, if the self perishes with the body, then all the fruits of actions performed in past lives would be lost at death. This means that whatever merit or sin a person accumulated throughout life would bear no fruit for him. This renders the very notion of karmic fruit utterly meaningless, an integral principle in Indian philosophy. If karmic fruit disappears after death, then there exists no moral or spiritual incentive for acquiring merit or avoiding sin. This could lead to moral decay in society, for humanity would lack any reason to act virtuously or refrain from wickedness.
Second, there is the question of fruits from actions one never committed—these too must be experienced in the present life. This argument reinforces the previous one. If the self is non-eternal and karmic fruit does not endure, then why should a person be held responsible for the pleasures and pains of his present life? We ordinarily attribute the suffering or joy we experience in this life to the karmic fruits of our past births. But if the self is non-eternal, this explanation collapses into absurdity.
In this view, the experiences of a person’s present life would seem chaotic and purposeless, explicable by no principle of justice or reason.
These two problems utterly demolish the doctrine of moral causation, or karma. Karma is the belief that every action bears a fruit, which the performer of that action must experience, whether in this life or the next. It is a fundamental principle acknowledged by nearly all Indian philosophy, including Buddhist and Jain thought. Karma is not merely a philosophical idea; it provides a social and moral framework that encourages people to live righteously. Should karma be nullified, criminal tendencies might flourish, for wrongdoers would see no lasting consequence to their deeds.
This aspect of Charvaka doctrine provoked widespread debate in Indian philosophy. Other schools—Vedanta, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, Sankhya, Yoga, and even Buddhist and Jain philosophy—all uphold the eternality of the soul and the continuity of karmic fruits. They believe that without the immortality of the soul and the unbroken chain of karmic consequences, the very notions of justice and morality become meaningless. The arguments of the Charvakas challenge the fundamental foundations of all these systems, creating a profound tension in Indian philosophical thought. The crux of this debate concerns whether the purposes of human life, morality, and conceptions of the afterlife ultimately rest upon the eternality or transience of the soul.
If moral causation, or karma, is to be preserved, then the existence of an eternal soul must be conceded—a soul that serves as the substratum for these karmic fruits. According to karma doctrine, each person must experience the fruit of their actions, for karmic fruit is never destroyed. Action generates an invisible force (adrushta), which becomes the cause of experiencing pleasure and pain in the future.
The inequality and diversity evident in the present world—such as the joy and suffering that arise from birth—can be explained in no other way. They must spring from the invisible power (adrushta) of karma accumulated in previous lives. According to Mimamsa philosophy, adrushta is the invisible result of ritual action, accumulated for the individual and known not through the five senses. This adrushta is that moral causation binding infinite multitudes of beings with diverse natures to a single law. Since this invisible force relates to the existence of previous births, and since the soul is the substratum of these karmic fruits, it must necessarily be beginningless and endless. An established principle holds: that which is unborn at the beginning has no end.
Thus, through this reasoning, it is demonstrated that the body and the sense organs cannot be the soul, for they are transient, limited, and generated entities. A transient soul cannot preserve the continuity of karmic fruits, which would disturb the moral order of the universe. Therefore, the existence of an eternal soul is indispensable, and the sole means of knowing it is the Vedas.
A fundamental question arises: is there any proof of the soul’s existence—is it natural or supernatural? The root of this objection lies in this: since the soul is not perceptible to the senses, it cannot be established through any method of proof.